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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
At page 2 of its brief, respondent seems to be con-
tending appellant cannot "appeal" from the trial court's 
denial of appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
the Issue of Liability, citing the Haslam case in which 
present counsel for respondent appeared. However, 
lawyer-like reading of appellant's notice of appeal (R. 
141) will disclose Union Pacific appealed from the final, 
appealable judgment of no cause of action entered 
against it; and additionally gave notice appellant would 
assert on appeal that the trial court should have granted 
appellant's l\fotion for Summary Judgment on the Issue 
of Liability. The difference behveen attempting to appeal 
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from a non-appealable judgment, on the one hand, and 
appealing from an appealable final judgment while ask-
ing thi.s appellate court for full relief on all phases of 
the case, on the other, is manifest. If respondent's cryptic 
remark on this subject is intended to cast doubt on the 
power of the Utah Supreme Court not only to reverse 
the judgment below but also to direct granting of appel-
lant's motion for summary judgment in its own favor 
on the issue of defendant's liability, then that remark is 
nonsense. Please see Rule 76 (a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; Allred vs. Allred, 12 U. (2d) 325, 366 P. (2d) 
478; Joseph vs. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hos-
pital, 7 U. (2d) 39, 318 P. (2d) 330; Dopp vs. Richards, 
43 U. 332, 135 P. 98; Dunn vs. Wallingford, 47 U. 491, 
155 P. 347; and Mastic Tile Division vs. Acme Distrib-
uting Co., 15 U. (2d) 136, 389 P. (2d) 56. If respondent's 
remark was not intended for that purpose, then the 
reason for its insertion into respondent's brief entirely 
eludes us. 
With complete disregard for Rule 75 (p) (2), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, respondent neither agreed with 
appellant's statement of the facts in this case nor indi-
cated wherein respondent controverted those facts. In-
stead respondent made its own incomplete and argumen-
tative "Statement of Facts." "\Vith much of that state-
ment (so far as it goes) appellant has no real quarrel. 
But appellant does hereby controvert some parts of that 
statement as follows: 
1. El Paso's statement (Respondent's Brief 9) that 
Union Pacific has conceded it could find "no written 
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record of, nor witness with personal recollection of awy 
discussion or negotiation on the subject of indemnity" is 
patently incorrect. To the contrary Union Pacific as-
serted, and El Paso conceded by stipulating that re-
sponses to requests for admission should be considered 
as established (R. 164), that there was discussion and 
negotiation between the parties hereto concerning the 
subject of indemnity; and that said discussion and nego-
tiation were both oral and written. Certainly the oral 
discussion described generally in plaintiff's response to 
defendant's requests for admission Nos. 9 and 11 (R. 
49,50,51,52,53) was one understood by all concerned to 
deal with, among other things, the subject matter of 
indemnity for losses as between the parties. Equally 
certainly the submission in writing to respondent on two 
separate occasions of the precise language of indemnity 
finally used in the deed involved in this lawsuit, and 
respondent's written acceptance of that language after 
time for adequate study, constitutes· material and very 
specific written discussion .and also "negotiation" on the 
subject of indemnity. (R 49. through 53, inclusive; and 
Exhibits X and Y at pages 55,56, and 57 of the record 
on appeal herein.) 
2. El Paso's assertion (Respondent's Brief 10) that 
Union Pacific accuses Judge Ellett of prejudging this-
this case is also inaccurate. We think it is demonstrably 
true Judge Ellett had some pretty strong convictions 
about the merits of this lawsuit before he had been af-
forded an opportunity to hear argument from both 
parties such as was later presented at the hearing on the 
motions for summary judgment. Please see the quota-
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tion of Judge Ellett's remarks as set forth at page 10 of 
respondent's brief. But neither appellant nor its counsel 
have ever stated or inf erred or implied that Judge 
Ellett did not ultimately afford appellant a full and fair 
hearing and an impartial consideration of the merits of 
this case by means of the procedure on the motions for 
summary judgment. Union Pacific said in its original 
brief that the procedure in the trial court was somewhat 
unusual (and we repeat that it was) in the course of 
explaining to this court exactly how this case reached 
the Supreme Court of Utah; but our assertion that the 
procedure was unusual does not charge Judge Ellett with 
any impropriety. On the contrary, our respect for Judge 
Ellett's integrity is rather thoroughly demonstrated by 
the fact Union Pacific willingly agreed to have the mo-
tions for summary judgment heard personally by Judge 
Ellett on March 4, 1965, at a special setting at 8 :00 a.m., 
after his remarks quoted and others of like tenor had 
been made and heard by appellant's counsel, and despite 
the further fact Judge Ellett was not even at that time 
the regularly assigned law and motion judge of the 
Third Judicial District Court. "\Ve have never said and 
do not now say Judge Ellett had a "closed-mind atti-
tude." "\Ve do respectfully contend he was legally wrong 
at the outset and he was legally wrong at the end because 
he erred as to the law in his decision of this case. 
3. Respondent's statement of facts is both incom-
plete and argumentative. For example, at page 8 of its 
brief respondent mentions that the railroad right of way 
on which Stacey was injured was owned by the Oregon 
Short Line Railroad Company. This blandly innocuous 
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assertion conveniently ignores the possessory interest of 
Union Pacific and also the nature of the total relation-
ship between Union Pacific Railroad Company and Ore-
gon Short Line Railroad Company shown by the record 
in this case. (R. 42,44,164) 
Respondent also conveniently ignores the highly sig-
nificant fact that the private crossing where Stacey was 
injured provided the only reasonably practical route for 
a land vehicle by which El Paso could reach the portion 
of the pipeline to which Stacey was enroute. (R.47,164) 
It can scarcely be doubted this factor has at least some 
bearing on decision of what these parties meant, or 
should be held to have meant, by the ingress and egress 
language used in the deed; and it has some bearing on 
whether or not El Paso has some right to use the cross-
ing by implication from the deed. 
Respondent asserts as a fact at page 10 of its brief 
that the deed here involved does not state it was intended 
to provide indemnity against loss resulting in whole, or 
in part, from plaintiff's own conduct. That assertion of 
respondent's counsel is not one of fact. It is simply 
counsel's argumentative version of the conclusions they 
desire drawn from the language of the deed and the sur-
rounding circumstances. 
ISSUES ELHIINATED 
As pointed out in our principal brief, respondent 
originally based its motion for a summary judgment on 
numerous grounds. Among other things, respondent as-
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serted (a) there was no consideration given for the in-
demnity agreement embodied in the deed here involved· 
' and (b) that the indemnity provision of the deed was 
void as against public policy. (R. 79) These assertions 
were repetitions of def ens es contained in respondent's 
answer. (R. 26) Since respondent makes no mention of 
either point in its brief before this court, despite the fact 
it placed reliance thereon in the trial court, and even 
argued at some length for (b) above in its written trial 
memorandum of authorities (R. 98,99,100), it would ap-
pear respondent has conceded the trial court's ruling 
cannot be sustained on these theories. Accordingly we 
respectfully submit respondent has abandoned both (a) 
and (b) above; and thereby concedes Points III and IV 
of our original brief. 
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT 
In its brief respondent now contends defendant has 
never based its principal defense on any doctrine of 
"proximate cause." (Respondent's Brief 17) In re-
sponse to this assertion, we respectfully direct the court's 
attention to the sixth defense set forth in defendant's 
answer (R. 26); to the third defense set forth in defend-
ant's answer (R. 26); to paragraph 4 of defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment (R. 79); to paragraph 1 of 
defendant's motion for summary judgment (R. 79); and 
to counsel's assertion in their memorandum to the trial 
court, capitalizing opportunistically upon what they then 
believed to be the views of the trial court, that Stacey's 
accident and Union Pacific's loss were caused by negli-
gence of Union Pacific in operating its trains; and that 
neither the operation, maintenance, nor existence of the 
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pipeline had any legally recognizable part in Stacey's 
accident. (R. 86,87,96,97) The changeable nature of 
respondent's position on this subject should be manifest. 
We respectfully submit that, if appellant's discussion in 
its original brief about the nature of the relationship be-
tween the existence, maintenance and operation of the 
pipeline and Stacey's accident with its consequent loss 
to Union Pacific is an attack upon a so-called "straw-
man," then that discussion becomes so only because re-
spondent has abandoned its previous position. But wis-
dom of respondent's counsel should not be ridiculed 
simply because belatedly acquired. We therefore accept 
at face value what must be taken to be the concession by 
respondent's counsel that the relationship between the 
existence, maintenance, and operation of the pipeline on 
the one hand, and Stacey's accident, on the other, need 
not be one of "proximate cause" in order to make the 
indemnity language of the deed applicable here. How-
ever, it should be noted careful review of respondent's 
brief shows respondent does not now suggest what sort 
of test of the connection between the existence and main-
tenance of the pipeline and the accident should replace 
the abandoned one of "proximate cause." Perhaps we 
will be enlightened at oral argument. 
The bare bones of respondent's argument, stripped 
of rhetoric and eliminating the confusion created by 
counsel's indiscriminate lumping of two separate prob-
lems into one, are these propositions : 
(A) Respondent contends there was absolutely no 
connection whatever between the existence, maintenance, 
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and operation of the pipeline and Stacey's accident. (Re-
spondent's Brief, last paragraph, page 32) 
(B) Respondent contends that, even if there was 
some connection, the indemnity language of the deed does 
not apply if Union Pacific's negligence also played a part 
therein. (Respondent's Brief 15) 
Neither contention is sound. Perhaps the very rea-
son for El Paso's counsel treating them generally as one 
proposition throughout their brief was and is a well 
founded concern that neither will separately stand care-
ful scrutiny. 
As to A, above, little more need be said than to note 
three things. (1) No sensible attorney would contend 
today for the universally discredited and rejected notion 
that there is or can be one and only one "cause" for any 
event. For that reason the fact that Union Pacific's 
negligence may have played a part in Stacey's accident 
does not even remotely suggest (much less establish) 
respondent's inarticulated but pervasive theme that the 
existence, maintenance and operation of the pipeline 
could not therefore also have played a part in the acci-
dent. (2) To say, as does respondent's counsel, that the 
1existence, maintenance and operation of the pipeline had 
nothing at all to do with the occurrence of the accident, 
one must blind oneself to actuality. The nature or tex-
ture of that connection, judged against the words "due 
to or arises because of" and otloor words used in the deed, 
may well justify thought and discussion, although re-
spondent's counsel have managed not to come to grips 
with that precise subject in their brief by taking refuge 
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in the categorical but demonstrably fallacious claim that 
there was no connection whatever. ( 3) The surrender 
or capitulation inherent in respondent's retreat from 
their trial court "proximate cause" position to their 
present one of saying flatly there is no connection be-
tween the pipeline and Stacey's accident at all, may be 
shown rather imp~ssively by our borrowing the very 
type of approach used by El Paso at page 15 of its brief. 
Is it not true that: Union Pacific's trains could have 
approached and used the crossing for a thousand years, 
daily or even hourly, and every time with the crew of 
the train guilty of ntegligence, and still there would have 
been no accident to Stacey and no loss to the plaintiff 
until a necessary antecedent fact occurred - that El 
Paso sent Stacey to use the crossing due to the neoos-
sity of El Paso's using that crossing to maintain, oper-
ate, and preserve the existence of El Paso's pipeline! 
The weakness of respondent's new position also be-
comes apparent upon application of the "but for" test, 
i.e.: But for the pipeline, its existence, maintenance and 
operation, would Stacey have been hurt 1 'Vhatever else 
may be said of this case, it just will not "wash" to say 
as do respondent's counsel that there is an utter lack of 
any connection whatever between El Paso's pipeline and 
Stacey's accident. 
As to B above, our principal brief has dealt rather 
fully with the defendant's contention in this regard. We 
would add -counsel for both parties seems to be in agree-
ment that, if the language of the deed provides clearly 
and unequivocally for indemnity coverage of accidents 
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and losses to which negligence of Union Pacific may 
have contributled in part, then the absence of some par-
ticular magic invocatory word or phrase to that effect 
is unimportant. (Respondent's Brief 34) We think it 
may be said with complete confidence that there is noth-
ing intrinsically "unclear" or "equivocal" about the fol-
lowing words : 
" ... any and all liability, loss, damage, claims, 
demands, actions, causes of action, costs and ex-
penses of whatsoever nature, ... growing out of 
injury or harm to or death of persons whomso-
ever ... when such injury, harm, death, loss ... , 
howsoever caused, ... in any ... way whatsoever 
is due to or arises because of the existence of the 
pipeline or the . . . operation, maintenance ... 
thefleof ... " 
The words themselves are surely plain enough. There-
fore unless they are emasculated through some unreason-
ing and blind hostility to all indemnity contracts, or by 
interpretation in comparison with some rigidly formal-
istic standards respondent has expressly disavowed (Re-
spondent's Brief 34), or by some wholly artificial test 
external to their own normal purport, they cover an acci-
dent or loss due in part to Union Pacific negligence. For 
"any and all losses" clearly include losses due in part to 
Union Pacific negligence. Losses sustained by "persons 
whomsoever" unequivocally include losses susta.iood by 
third persons to whom Union Pacific would not even be 
liaJble in the first place unless negligent. And accidents 
or losses "however caused" include specifically, clearly, 
and unequivocally accidents or losses even when caused 
in part by Union Pacific negligence. To advocate to the 
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contrary of the foregoing three statements is to say the 
parties did not really mean what the words say. Re-
spondent advocates to the contrary not by analysis of the 
intrinsic meaning of the words set forth but simply be-
cause the language is very inclusive. However, inclusive-
ness of language is of itself neither vague nor unclear 
nor equivocal in many situations. On the contrary inclu-
siveness is exceedingly precise, and indeoed the only way 
to be precise, when parties to an instrument intend spe-
cifically to describe a broadly inclusive situation. That 
was and is the case here. 
Moreover, respondent's whole approach to this 
"clear and unequivocal'' problem is anomalous. Re-
spondent starts with the precept that an intention to 
indemnify against the indemnitee's own negligence must 
be expressed "clearly and unequivocally"; continues by 
conceding as correct a second precept that no magic or 
talismanic word or phrase is required to meet the "clear 
and unequivocal" test, if the intent is otherwise plainly 
manifested; but ends with the non-sequitur that no such 
intent is plainly manifested in the case at bar simply 
because (so far as we can tell from respondent's brief) 
the deed in question does not specifically contain some 
appropriate ritualistic phrase including the word "negli-
gence'' or a synonym thereof. ·while appellant freely 
acknowledges some courts have also sometimes resorted 
to this elusive approach, due largely to an outmoded and 
nebulous antipathy for full enforcement of express in-
demnity agreements, that does not justify perpetuation 
of the error. In other words to concede in one breath no 
particular language is necessary to be "clear and un-
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equivocal," but then to insist in the next breath as does 
respondent that only a few selected words or phras'es 
can ever be recognized or construed as sufficient, has 
nothing to commend it either in logic or consistency. The 
principle argued for by respondent might be described 
as a legal mirage. It is akin to a supposedly permanent 
historical document written with vanishing ink. It has 
a detectable aroma of pseudo-profundity similar to that 
emanating from remarkable sentences such as: "(This) 
is an area in which to cover all does not include one of 
the parts," taken herewith from the Batson-Cook case 
cited in respondent's brief, as to which we have more to 
say hereafter. 
Further comment on respondent's technique in 
answering appellant's original brief is necessary. Appel-
lant in that brief, properly we submit, divided its argu-
ment into four parts. The first, Point I, dealt with our 
position on the relationship of the existence and mainte-
nance of the pipeline to the accident. The second, Point II, 
dealt with whether or not the indemnity language used in 
the deed covered an accident in which negligence of the 
appellant played some part. We cited cases separately 
for each point. While it is true some cases cited in our 
original brief were pertinent on both matters, there was 
no representation in the brief that all cases cited in sup-
port of appellant's Point I were significant as to Point 
II, or vice versa. So when counsel for respon~nt discuss 
our authorities supporting our Point I by resort to point-
ing out claimed differences between those authorities 
and the case at bar as to our Point II, we respond their 
method of challenge is hardly worthy of their abilities. 
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For examples of this sort of technique in respondent's 
argument, please see pa~s 27 and 28 of respondent's 
brief where respondent's counsel discuss the Alabama 
Great So. case (cited by us as pertinent to Point I of 
our original brief) in terms of its applicability to our 
Point II, despite the fact there was no such question as 
our Point II involved in that case at all. Please see page 
33 of respondent's brief where this identical technique 
is used as to the Ryan ease. 
And finally as to the type of approach respondent's 
counsel have employed, we ask the court to note their dis-
cussion of the Rissler case at page 33 of their brief. 
There respondent attempts to explain the only Wyoming 
case either side has discovered by equating the words: 
"even though the operation of the Railway Company's 
railroad may have caused or contribufod thereto" to a 
specific use of the word "negligence" or some synonym 
therefor. Such an equation is plainly wrong unless it is 
now the case that merely to operate a railroad is negli-
gence. For our own part, we urge it is considerably 
more appropriate to equate the quoted phrase from the 
Riss~er decision to the words: "howsoever caused," used 
in the case at bar. 
RE:SPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S 
A UTHORYfIES 
Next, we desire to make a few brief observations 
with regard to respondent's authorities. Respondent 
places its greatest reliance on the Vinnell case cited on 
at least three separate occasions in its brief. In the 
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Vinnell case, (California) 340 P. (2d) 604 at page 607, 
the California Supreme Court said: 
'~The rule in this state, as :expressed in the 
cases referred to, is in accord with the weight of 
authority. 'In the overwhelming majority of the 
cases the result reached by their int.ierpretational 
efforts can be condensed into the simple rule that 
where the parties fail to refer expressly to negli-
gence in their contract such failure evidences the 
parties' intention not to provide for indemnity for 
the indemnitee's negligent acts.' Annotation 175 
A. L. R. 8." 
Whatever may be the law in California, and what-
ever may be the merits of the old A.L.R. quotation cited 
therein as to the weight of authority (we think a current 
survey of the cases on a statistical basis would belie that 
quotation), both the law of Wyoming and the law of 
Utah are contrary to the Vinnell case. In the Rissler 
decision cited in our original brief and again herein, it is 
stated without qualifiication that an indemnity agreement 
need not refer expressly to negligence. C.&N.W. Railway 
Co. vs. Rissler, 184 F. Supp. 98, at the bottom of the 
first column on page 102. In the Barrus case, cited by 
both parties herein, this court declined to limit the Utah 
law to the rigid boundaries encompassed by the phra8€: 
"refer expressly to negligence." Barrus vs. Wilkinson, 
16 U. (2d) 204, 398 P. (2d) 207. And even California 
has not remained steadfast w}tll its anachronistic rule. 
Harviey Machine Co. Inf. ~t}~ehler, (1960) (California) 
353 P. (2d) - q J. '/-, 
The Batson-Cook case, 257 F. (2d) 410, is also heavi-
ly relied upon by respondent, being cited at three sepa-
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rate places in its brief. It is initially worthy of note 
this 1case itself rejects the California doctrine which was 
expressied in the Vinnell decision. Please see page 412 of 
the report wherein it is stated: 
" ... it is the law which ... tells the parties 
that while it need not be done in any particular 
language or form, unless the intention is unequiv-
ocally expressed in the plainest of words, the law 
will consider that the parties did not undertake 
to indemnify one against the consequences of his 
own negli~ence." 
And Batson-Cook, milder though it is than the 
California rule of Vinnell, has not escaped penetrating 
criticism. Please see :Moses-Ecco Company vs. Roscoe-
Ajax Corporation, 320 F. (2d) 685, at page 688, and also 
footnote 2. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
has itself refused to attempt justification of its Batson-
Cook opinion. Please see Miller and Company of Bir-
mingham vs. Louisville and N.R. Co., 328 F. (2d) 73, 
at pages 75 and 76. Please also see American Agricul-
tural Chemical Co. vs. Tampa Armature Works, 315 F. 
(2d) 856, at the top of the first column at page 860, 
where Judge Brown who wrote Batson-Cook conceded his 
own court had refused to be bound to his decision therein 
in deciding Jacksonville Terminal Co. vs. Railway Ex-
press Agency, Inc., heretofore cited in our original brief. 
To undertake to eomment on every case relied upon 
by respondent would unduly prolong this Reply Brief. 
Suffice it the ref Ofle to say there are to be found in the 
cases decisions of all shadings as to what words will be 
sufficient to justify indemnity against the indemnitee's 
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own negligence. vVe respectfully submit that the trend 
is away from ritualism and toward the modern ideas 
expressed in the Rissler decision. There is no reason 
for this court to regress in the case at bar. 
RE1SPONDENT'S RIGHT TO USE 
OF THE PRIVATE CROSSING 
Respondent argues at page 35 of its brief that El 
Paso acquired no right to use the private crossing by 
implication because Oregon Short Line Railroad Com-
pany "owned" the railroad right of way. The argument 
seems to be that the deed to El Paso's predecessor was 
from Union Paicific who could not create a private way 
of necessity over the land of a stranger, Oregon Short 
Line R.R. Co. (hereinafter referred to as 0.S.L.). In 
view of the relationship between U.P. and O.S.L. shown 
in this record and known to all, respondent's characteri-
zation of their relationship as "strangers" is difficult 
to understand. To pose the question realistically: Would 
a court today have any real difficulty in finding U.P. 
conveyed some right to use of this private crossing by 
implication since it was the only available route, when 
U.P. is lessee of the entire railroad of O.S.L., when 
U.P. owns all stock of O.S.L., and when all parties 
to the deed actually treated the situation as one where-
in El Paso had acquired some right to use the crossing 
- and all on the theory 0.S.L. owned legal title to 
the railroad right of way and vrns a total "stranger" 
to the U.P. ~ Even if there could conceivably be some 
difficulty in finding El Paso obtained such a right to 
use the crossing as against the fee ownership of O.S.L., 
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surely there is no "stranger" to the title theory which 
precluded El Paso's having acquired a right to use the 
private crossing as against Union Pacific, to the full 
extent of Union Pacific's possessory interest in the O.S.L. 
right of way, for the entire duration of U.P. 's system 
lease of the 0.S.L. 
RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S 
EMOTIONAL ARGUMENT 
Respondent says in its "Conclusion" the rule of this 
case will apply to all - not just to "major corporations." 
To this we take no general exception. But it iS not inap-
propriate to note the Oregon Supreme Court has recently 
said, in substance, the intent of two major corporations 
in dealing with each other at arm's length in an indem-
nity situation of this sort may well be determined by 
a court to be a different thing than in dealings between 
other types of parties. Please see Southern Pacific Co. 
vs. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., (Oregon) 338 P. (2d) 
665, at pages 672 and 673. This is not to say the rule of 
law is different as between large and small. It is to say 
the intent naturally to be gleaned from indemnity lan-
guage used by two "major" corporations of relatively 
t>qual stature should not be diluted out of counsel's syn-
thetic or hypotheti1cal concern for some imaginary "em-
battled farmer or rancher who seeks a right of way for 
pasturage." (Respondent's Brief 37). El Paso Natural 
Gas Company is no "embattled farmer." 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant asks reversal of the judgment; directions 
to the trial court to grant appellant's Motion for Sum-
mary Judgment on the Issue of Liability; a trial on the 
issue of appellant's damages; and costs herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH 
A. U. MINER 
HOWARD F. CORAY 
SCOTT l\f. MATHESON 
NORMANW.KETTNER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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